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THE GOALS OF ANTITRUST:  
WELFARE TRUMPS CHOICE 
Joshua D. Wright* & Douglas H. Ginsburg** 
INTRODUCTION 
The evolution of U.S. Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence over the 
past fifty years is well known.  As one of us has written, “[f]orty years ago, 
the U.S. Supreme Court simply did not know what it was doing in antitrust 
cases.”1  The Court interpreted the Sherman2 and Clayton Acts3 to reflect a 
hodgepodge of social and political goals, many with an explicitly 
anticompetitive bent, such as protecting small traders from more efficient 
rivals.4  The failure of antitrust law to promote competition and further 
consumer welfare over this period is unsurprising and inevitable, for the 
courts and agencies were operating without a coherent answer to the 
question:  “What are the goals of antitrust?” 
The economic revolution in antitrust that took hold in the Supreme Court 
in the late 1970s and the 1980s was brought on at least in part by Robert 
Bork’s analysis of the original understanding of the Sherman Act.5  In 
 
*  Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, and Professor (on leave), George Mason 
University School of Law and Department of Economics.  The views stated here are my own 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or other Commissioners. 
**  Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, and Professor of Law, New York University.  The authors thank Anna Aryankalayil 
and Angela Diveley for research assistance. 
 1. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis:  Two Case Studies of 
Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 217, 217 (2010). 
 2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). 
 3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; 29 U.S.C. § 52–53 (2006). 
 4. See Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 703 (1967) (condemning 
rivals’ attempts to compete with Utah Pie by lowering prices because “each of the 
respondents also bore responsibility for the downward pressure on the price structure” and 
the “[Clayton] Act reaches . . . price discrimination that is intended to have immediate 
destructive impact”); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“[W]e 
cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through the protection of 
viable, small, locally owned businesses.  Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs 
and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.  It 
resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization.”); United States v. 
Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897) (antitrust law exists to protect “small 
dealers and worthy men”). 
 5. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 
7 (1966); see also Douglas H. Ginsburg, Judge Bork, Consumer Welfare, and Antitrust Law, 
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 449 (2008) (excerpted from Douglas H. Ginsburg, An 
Introduction to Bork (1966), 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring 2006, at 225). 
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Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,6 the Court, shifting its focus 
from this mix of economic, social, and political goals to the overall market 
impact of an alleged restraint of trade, recognized the potential for vertical 
nonprice restrictions to promote interbrand competition and declared 
interbrand competition “the primary concern of antitrust law.”7  It is 
difficult to overstate the importance of GTE Sylvania as the foundation of 
the economic approach to antitrust analysis:  antitrust would no longer serve 
multiple masters; economic goals would be exclusive.  Soon the Court 
would determine more specifically that the “Congress designed the 
Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription,’”8 and that “[a] restraint 
that has the effect of reducing the importance of consumer preference in 
setting price and output is not consistent with this fundamental goal of 
antitrust law.”9 
The promotion of economic welfare10 as the lodestar of antitrust laws—
to the exclusion of social, political, and protectionist goals—transformed 
the state of the law and restored intellectual coherence to a body of law 
Robert Bork had famously described as paradoxical.11  Indeed, there is now 
widespread agreement that this evolution toward welfare and away from 
noneconomic considerations has benefitted consumers and the economy 
more broadly.12  Welfare-based standards have led to greater predictability 
 
 6. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 7. Id. at 52–56. 
 8. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). 
 9. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984). 
 10. We put to the side issues of whether the appropriate standard is aggregate economic 
efficiency, often referred to as the total welfare standard or “true” consumer welfare (in the 
economic sense of a consumer surplus) standard. See generally Ken Heyer, Welfare 
Standards and Merger Analysis:  Why Not the Best?, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 
2006, at 29; Steven C. Salop, Question:  What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare 
Standard?  Answer:  The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336 
(2010).  Our focus is upon the desirability of welfare standards over alternative non-welfare 
antitrust objectives, and more specifically, over the proposed “consumer choice” standard. 
 11. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:  A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 7 
(1978) (demonstrating “[c]ertain of its doctrines preserve competition, while others suppress 
it, resulting in a policy at war with itself”). 
 12. 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 110 (3d ed. 2006) 
(“The biggest advantages conferred by the use of relatively traditional microeconomics as 
the guiding principle for antitrust are two:  coherence and welfare. . . .  [P]opulist goals 
should be given little or no independent weight in formulating antitrust rules and 
presumptions.  As far as antitrust is concerned, they are substantially served by a 
procompetitive policy framed in economic terms. . . .  [I]njection of populist goals, by 
broadening the proscriptions of business conduct, would multiply legal uncertainties and 
threaten inefficiencies not easily recognized or proved. . . .  [Despite some inadequacies,] 
economics gives a focus to antitrust interpretation and is critical to any formulation of 
rational rules.”); William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition 
Law for Dominant Firm Conduct:  The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 1, 35 (“Both [the Chicago School and Harvard School] generally embrace an 
economic efficiency orientation that emphasizes reliance on economic theory in the 
formulation of antitrust rules.  Although Chicago School and Harvard School scholars do not 
define efficiency identically, the two schools discourage consideration of non-efficiency 
objectives such as the dispersion of political power and the preservation of opportunities for 
smaller enterprises to compete.”); Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future 
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in judicial and agency decision making.  They also rule out theories of 
liability (e.g., a transaction will tend to reduce the number of small 
businesses in a market) and defenses (e.g., the restraint upon trade is 
necessary to save consumers from the consequences of competition) that 
would significantly harm consumers.  Further, the focus upon economic 
welfare has led the Court to reject per se prohibitions of conduct once 
thought anticompetitive but now, owing to advances in our economic 
knowledge, understood to be efficient.13  Untethered from an economic 
welfare standard, it is difficult to imagine a rationale for eliminating those 
per se prohibitions. 
The “consumer choice” standard is the latest challenge to the welfarist 
understanding of antitrust.14  In a series of articles, Neil Averitt and Robert 
Lande present the consumer choice standard as an alternative to efficiency 
or welfare standards15—including not only the “consumer welfare” and 
 
of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987) (“Antitrust law is a pro-
competition policy.  The economic goal of such a policy is to promote consumer welfare 
through the efficient use and allocation of resources, the development of new and improved 
products, and the introduction of new production, distribution, and organizational techniques 
for putting economic resources to beneficial use. . . .  The legislative history of the Sherman 
Act and other antitrust laws also suggests ‘populist’ goals—social and political reasons for 
limiting business size and preserving large numbers of small businesses and business 
opportunities.  However, economics-based antitrust law serves those goals to a substantial 
extent by preventing agreements, mergers, and monopolizing conduct that tend to eliminate 
or reduce competition without yielding economic benefits. . . .  [T]here is no reasonable 
basis for presuming that courts must give priority or even weight to populist goals where the 
pursuit of such goals might injure consumer welfare by interfering with competitive pricing, 
efficiency, or innovation.  Indeed, even where there is no such apparent conflict, it is 
questionable whether populist goals are appropriate factors to consider when formulating 
antitrust rules.  The pursuit of these goals would broaden antitrust’s proscriptions to cover 
business conduct that has no significant anticompetitive effects, would increase vagueness in 
the law, and would discourage conduct that promotes efficiencies not easily recognized or 
proved.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 
(2007) (lifting per se prohibition of minimum resale price maintenance (RPM)); State Oil 
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 19 (1997) (lifting per se prohibition of maximum RPM); Cont’l 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977) (lifting the per se prohibition against 
vertical nonprice restraints). 
 14. Earlier such challenges include Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original 
and Primary Concern of Antitrust:  The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 50 HASTINGS 
L.J. 871, 874 (1999) (the “Congress was concerned principally with preventing ‘unfair’ 
transfers of wealth from consumers to firms with market power.”); Robert Pitofsky, The 
Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979) (“[I]f the free-market 
sector of the economy is allowed to develop under antitrust rules that are blind to all but 
economic concerns, the likely result will be an economy so dominated by a few corporate 
giants that it will be impossible for the state not to play a more intrusive role in economic 
affairs.”); Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 624 
(2012) (rejecting “[a]ntitrust’s current objectives of promoting consumer welfare and 
efficiency” in favor of using antitrust to “secure political, economic, and individual 
freedoms”). 
 15. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice:  The Practical Reason 
for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 44 (1998) 
[hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Consumer Choice]; Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, 
Consumer Sovereignty:  A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 
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“total welfare” standards16 but even the “consumer surplus” standard.17  
Perhaps the clearest articulation of the consumer choice standard is that 
“[a]n antitrust violation can . . . be understood as an activity that 
unreasonably restricts the totality of price and nonprice choices that would 
have otherwise been available.”18 
Averitt and Lande occasionally use their alternative model to highlight 
perceived weaknesses in the current approach to nonprice competition and 
to call for a greater focus upon that dimension of the competitive process.19  
That shift would be desirable to the extent it improves courts’ and agencies’ 
ability to understand the competitive consequences of some business 
arrangements.  Still, they clearly have something more ambitious, even 
grandiose, in mind:  “nothing less than a new paradigm of the antitrust 
laws.”20  They also point to the consumer choice standard as the starting 
point for understanding section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
Act;21 the gap between the European and the purportedly less well-targeted 
U.S. law of monopolization;22 a unified theory of competition and 
consumer protection law;23 and the role of behavioral economics in 
antitrust.24 
Averitt and Lande correctly claim that adopting the central idea of the 
consumer choice framework, viz. that the loss of a “choice” (however 
defined) is a cognizable antitrust injury even when associated with a 
reduction in price or an increase in output, would represent a revolution in 
antitrust thinking.  As we shall explain, that revolution would have 
seriously detrimental consequences for consumers. 
 
ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Consumer Sovereignty]; Neil W. 
Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (2007) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Using Consumer Choice]; Robert 
H. Lande, Consumer Choice As the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 503 
(2001). 
 16. Heyer, supra note 10. 
 17. Salop, supra note 10. 
 18. Averitt & Lande, Using Consumer Choice, supra note 15, at 182. 
 19. Id. at 176 (“The current price and efficiency models can deal only awkwardly with 
nonprice competition.  At best, they try to help consumers achieve nonprice objectives 
indirectly, by folding them into the price analysis in the form of quality adjusted prices, or by 
assuming that markets that are price competitive will also be competitive for nonprice 
preferences.”). 
 20. Id. at 178. 
 21. Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Acts or Practices” in Section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 GEO. L.J. 225, 281–82 (1981).  Section 5 makes 
unlawful, and authorizes the FTC to prohibit, “unfair methods of competition.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(a)(1) (2006). 
 22. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, FTC, Can Consumer Choice Promote Trans-Atlantic 
Convergence of Competition Law and Policy?, Remarks Before the Concurrences 
Conference on “Consumer Choice”:  An Emerging Standard for Competition Law (June 8, 
2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/120608consumerchoice.pdf. 
 23. Averitt & Lande, Consumer Sovereignty, supra note 15. 
 24. Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economics at the Gate:  Antitrust in the Twenty-First 
Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513 (2007). 
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The fatal flaw in the consumer choice standard is that it simply, indeed 
simplistically, rejects economic analysis of consumer preferences as the 
fundamental guiding principle of antitrust analysis, including the 
preferences consumers express in making unavoidable tradeoffs between 
price and nonprice values.  The consumer choice standard rejects even the 
view that the role of antitrust is to protect the competitive process as one 
that produces desirable outputs (i.e., consumer welfare) in favor of an 
antitrust regime that analyzes nonprice competition as a standalone and 
inviolable virtue. 
Part I of this Essay reviews the consumer choice standard as its 
proponents present it.  We demonstrate that the consumer choice standard is 
necessarily a noneconomic approach to antitrust analysis; that is, it is 
inconsistent with not only the economic welfare standard but also with 
much of modern economic theory and practice, despite its authors 
occasionally restating it in economic terms as a call for greater attention to 
nonprice competition. 
Part II demonstrates that the consumer choice standard, like other 
noneconomic objectives of antitrust that have been rejected in the past, 
would inevitably reduce both total and consumer welfare.  Ironically, it 
would also diminish what the authors most value:  nonprice competition, 
product variety, and innovation. 
I.  THE CONSUMER CHOICE STANDARD 
The consumer choice standard was born out of a concern that the 
traditional welfare approach ignores the benefits that nonprice competition 
generates for consumers.  Averitt and Lande occasionally promote a milder 
form of the choice standard, one based upon welfare but, they say, “fully 
attentive to empirical evidence on purchasers’ nonprice, as well as price, 
preferences.”25  They point to supposed failures of the standard approach, 
which, owing to conceptual and technological shortcomings, they claim 
ignores or insufficiently takes account of nonprice competition.26 
The primary flaw in the traditional welfare approach, according to 
Averitt and Lande, is economists’ purported inability to quantify and 
incorporate qualitative considerations into the price dimension, with which 
they are more familiar, and their consequent failure to account fully for 
consumer welfare gains and losses associated with changes in nonprice 
competition.27  For example, Averitt and Lande assert that “[o]nly rarely do 
economists make serious attempts” to evaluate the welfare consequences of 
innovations and, even when economists do so, Averitt and Lande are 
skeptical of the process by which they “somehow” generate quality-
adjusted prices.28 
 
 25. Averitt & Lande, Using Consumer Choice, supra note 15, at 184. 
 26. Id. at 184–86. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 178 n.7, 186 n.29. 
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This critique is at the least an overstatement.  Quality-adjusted prices 
have been part of the industrial organization toolkit since the early 1900s.29  
The Bureau of Labor Statistics has used this tool for nearly a century.30  
Furthermore, quality-adjusted prices are frequently used in industrial 
organization economics31 and in antitrust analysis.32 
 
 29. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BLS HANDBOOK OF METHODS, ch. 14, at 3–4 (1997), 
available at www.bls.gov/opub/hom/ (“When a company respondent reports a price that 
reflects a physical change in a product, the BLS uses one of several quality adjustment 
methods.”); IRVING FISHER, THE MAKING OF INDEX NUMBERS:  A STUDY OF THEIR VARIETIES, 
TESTS, AND RELIABILITY 459–60 (1922) (“The first index numbers were of wholesale prices 
and most index numbers are such today.  For a long time it was thought that goods at retail 
were not sufficiently standardized as to quality to make retail index numbers practicable.  
This difficulty has not been fully overcome.  But index numbers of retail prices of foods 
were begun in the United States in 1907, and today index numbers of retail prices are very 
common in most countries.”); PRICE STATISTICS REVIEW COMM., NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. 
RESEARCH, THE PRICE STATISTICS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1961), available at 
http://www.nber.org/books/repo61-1; FREDERICK V. WAUGH, QUALITY AS A DETERMINANT 
OF VEGETABLE PRICES 47 (1929) (“By making an adjustment to allow for the variation in 
these quality factors, the following estimate was made of the average price . . . .”). 
 30. See WESLEY CLAIR MITCHELL, BULLETIN OF THE U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS:  
INDEX NUMBERS OF WHOLESALE PRICES IN THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES 10 
(1915) (“The grading and standardizing of commodities increased the number of articles 
which could be safely accepted as substantially uniform in quality from one year to the 
next.”). 
 31. For representative examples in the economics literature, see Thomas W. Hazlett, 
Prices and Outputs Under Cable TV Reregulation, 12 J. REG. ECON. 173 (1997); Andrew 
Stewart Wise & Kiran Duwadi, Competition Between Cable Television and Direct Broadcast 
Satellite:  The Importance of Switching Costs and Regional Sports Networks, 1 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 679, 679 (2005) (“We find that, when quality-adjusted prices for 
basic cable services increase substantially, subscribers will switch from cable to [direct 
broadcast satellite], presumably at the point at which the price change is larger than the cost 
of switching.”).  On modern approaches to generating quality-adjusted prices, see Robert J. 
Gordon & Zvi Griliches, Quality Change & New Products, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 84 (1997); 
Jerry Hausman, Sources of Bias and Solutions to Bias in the Consumer Price Index, 17 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 23 (2003).  For examples of the economic approach to valuing the consumer 
welfare gains from the introduction of new products, adjusted for quality, see Jerry A. 
Hausman, Valuation of New Goods Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF NEW GOODS 209 (Timothy F. Bresnahan & Robert J. Gordon eds., 1997); 
Amil Petrin, Quantifying the Benefits of New Products:  The Case of the Minivan, 110 J. 
POL. ECON. 705 (2002). 
 32. Including antitrust analysis at the Federal Trade Commission and by Federal Trade 
Commission economists. See, e.g., David J. Balan & George Deltas, Better Product at Same 
Cost, Lower Sales and Lower Welfare (FTC, Working Paper No. 312, 2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp312.pdf; Daniel P. Kessler, Can Ranking Hospitals on 
the Basis of Patients’ Travel Distances Improve Quality of Care? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 11419, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w11419.pdf.  Merger simulation models also account for quality.  Merger simulations 
estimate a choice model and then simulate consumer substitution patterns explicitly taking 
quality into account when the merged firms internalize price competition between them. See 
Steven Tenn et al., Mergers When Firms Compete by Choosing Both Price and Promotion, 
28 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 695 (2010); Gregory J. Werden et al., Merger Simulation, 
in ECONOMETRICS:  LEGAL, PRACTICAL, AND TECHNICAL ISSUES 269 (John D. Harkrider ed., 
2005); Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated 
Products Industries:  Logit Demand and Merger Policy, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 407 (1994); 
Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 
in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 43 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008).  Courts have also 
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If the consumer choice standard were no more than an evidence-based 
approach to incorporating nonprice competition into the traditional welfare 
standard, it would be unobjectionable.  Averitt and Lande, however, clearly 
contemplate a departure from the welfare standard in favor of a strong 
presumption of illegality for any business conduct that reduces the number 
of choices available to consumers.33  The flaw in this approach is that both 
economic theory and empirical evidence are replete with examples of 
business conduct that simultaneously reduces choice and increases welfare 
in the form of lower prices, increased innovation, or higher quality products 
and services.  Nonetheless, Averitt and Lande propose to define an antitrust 
violation as “an activity that unreasonably restricts the totality of price and 
nonprice choices that would otherwise have been available,”34 or 
alternatively, as business conduct “that harmfully and significantly limits 
the range of choices that the free market, absent the restraints being 
challenged, would have provided.”35 
Understanding the business arrangements that restrict the number of price 
and nonprice choices facing consumers and would therefore violate the 
consumer choice standard, requires an economic model of the number of 
choices that would be available to consumers in the counterfactual scenario 
without the restraint.  The types of conduct that would be illegal under the 
consumer choice standard, and the implications of that standard, are best 
illustrated with a series of examples drawn from Averitt and Lande’s 
analyses.  We present one example for each of the three major concerns of 
antitrust law:  cartels, mergers, and monopolization. 
We begin with the least controversial of business arrangements under the 
antitrust laws:  naked price-fixing arrangements are per se illegal under the 
current welfare standard and also would be under the choice standard.  
Averitt and Lande, however, object to more than just the allocative 
inefficiency of price-fixing.  “Under the choice approach,” they say, 
“[cartels] are undesirable” because “[p]rices fixed at an artificial level rob 
consumers of the competing price options to which they are entitled.”36 
There is no debating that cartels restrict output and increase price; they 
also reduce the variance of prices within a market.37  Averitt and Lande 
 
recognized the impact of business conduct upon quality-adjusted prices. See, e.g., Roland 
Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984) (“If, as [Defendant] 
argues, exclusive dealing leads dealers to promote each manufacturer’s brand more 
vigorously than would be the case under nonexclusive dealing, the quality-adjusted price to 
the consumer (where quality includes the information and other services that dealers render 
to their customers) may be lower with exclusive dealing than without, even though a 
collateral effect of exclusive dealing is to slow the pace at which new brands . . . are 
introduced.”). 
 33. Averitt & Lande, Using Consumer Choice, supra note 15, at 184. 
 34. Id. at 182. 
 35. Id. at 184. 
 36. Id. at 187 n.35. 
 37. See, e.g., Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., A Variance Screen for Collusion, 24 INT’L J. 
INDUS. ORG. 467, 473 (2006) (case study showed price-rigging “conspiracy not only 
increased the price level but reduced its variance as well.”); John M. Connor, Collusion and 
 2412 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
make clear that under the choice standard, pricing arrangements that restrict 
the availability of price options would be unlawful even if they do not 
increase average prices.38  Such a rule would amount to harmless error in 
the case of naked price-fixing cartels, but it exposes some troublesome 
implications of the consumer choice approach in the area of horizontal 
restraints that involve prices as well as pricing practices more generally. 
Consider Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,39 which 
involved the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers 
(ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), joint ventures by which 
thousands of owners of copyrighted music established blanket licensing 
agreements for use of their music on network television programs.40  The 
Supreme Court analyzed the restraint and concluded it was unlikely to 
reduce welfare.41  In fact, the Court found the restraint necessary to the 
distribution of the music, which would not otherwise have been practical 
because it would have required thousands of individual transactions 
between composers and consumers (here represented by broadcasters).42  
All the same, the blanket license was the product of an agreement among 
competitors to reduce dramatically the number of pricing options that might 
have been available to consumers but for the restraint.43  This welfare-
increasing arrangement necessarily violates the consumer choice standard. 
The economic logic of the choice framework is also problematic for the 
many business practices that involve price discrimination.  Price 
discrimination is generally efficient and welfare increasing.44  For 
simplicity, imagine a monopolist able to engage in perfect price 
discrimination (i.e., charging each individual the maximum price that 
consumer is willing to pay instead of offering a single, uniform price to all).  
(This is what colleges and universities with market power are doing when 
they set a high price and then give scholarships based upon “ability to 
pay.”)  Price discrimination reduces the availability of pricing options in the 
marketplace because the pricing arrangement deprives some consumers of 
 
Price Dispersion, 12 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 335, 336 (2005) (“[C]artelization suggest[s] a 
reduction in price variance.”). 
 38. Averitt & Lande, Using Consumer Choice, supra note 15, at 187 n.35. 
 39. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 40. Id. at 4–5. 
 41. See id. at 20–21. 
 42. Id. at 21. 
 43. Id. at 32–33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 44. This is true in the static economic welfare case.  The welfare case in favor of price 
discrimination becomes stronger when one considers the role of price discrimination in 
intensifying upstream competition and dynamic efficiencies such as the incentive to 
innovate. See James C. Cooper et al., Does Price Discrimination Intensify Competition? 
Implications for Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 327 (2005); Benjamin Klein & John Shepard 
Wiley, Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination As an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual 
Property Refusals To Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599 (2003).  This economic logic highlights a 
relationship entirely ignored in the choice analysis between business arrangements restricting 
choice and simultaneously increasing incentives to innovate or to improve quality, thus 
increasing choice.  The choice model provides no method, in the absence of welfare analysis, 
of analyzing these tradeoffs. 
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their preferred option—namely, the option to pay a uniform and lower 
price—that would be available in the absence of discriminatory pricing.  
Although each consumer is still offered a single price, and thus, the number 
of pricing options available to each consumer remains unchanged, it is clear 
that the choice standard would condemn this practice.45  Recall that for 
Averitt and Lande, price-fixing is condemned not because it reduces the 
total number of prices available in the market—and it need not do so, for 
example, when a single competitive price is replaced by a single cartel 
price—but because consumers are deprived of pricing options.  Price 
discrimination necessarily results in higher prices for some consumers than 
they would otherwise be offered.  Price discrimination in the case of our 
example of a perfectly price-discriminating monopolist is efficient; but 
price discrimination is also a common feature of competitive markets.  The 
ubiquity of price discrimination in the modern economy renders 
troublesome the implication that the choice model would condemn it. 
Averitt and Lande also posit a merger between two firms—call them A 
and B—in a market with five firms (also including C, D, and E).46  We are 
asked to assume that A, B, and C have the capacity to compete by 
innovating; that “three firms are enough to have effective price competition 
in this industry; and that three firms are also enough for effective choice or 
innovation competition.”47  They conclude that such a merger would likely 
be lawful under a welfare approach because enough firms remain for the 
market to be competitive but unlawful under their choice analysis because it 
would reduce the number of independent sources of choice or of innovation 
to less than the optimal number.48 
Ignoring for a moment that we are very unlikely ever to know the optimal 
number of firms for innovation in a given market,49 and certainly cannot do 
so with the current set of economic tools,50 the merger example sheds 
additional light upon problems with the choice model.  The critical point is 
that the choice model assumes a strong relationship between market 
structure and innovation, the latter under the rubric of choice:  in short, 
fewer firms generate less innovation and therefore fewer choices.  That 
strong presumption simply is not warranted by the evidence.  Not 
surprisingly, therefore, it is also inconsistent with modern merger analysis, 
which has retreated from structural presumptions because they are not 
 
 45. The choice standard would also condemn a variety of other discriminatory pricing 
arrangements, not limited to perfect price discrimination, for the reasons described in the 
text. 
 46. Averitt & Lande, Using Consumer Choice, supra note 15, at 246. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 22 (2007) (“The literature addressing how market structure affects 
innovation (and vice versa) in the end reveals an ambiguous relationship in which factors 
unrelated to competition play an important role.”). 
 50. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of 
Antitrust Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 12 (2012). 
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probative of likely competitive effects, including competitive effects 
associated with nonprice dimensions of competition.51 
The merger example highlights another problem with application of the 
choice standard.  The authors’ example, in which it is known how many 
firms are “sufficient” for nonprice and price competition, not only assumes 
knowledge of facts that are not ordinarily known and in most cases are 
unknowable, it also obfuscates the key economic tradeoff at issue in 
analyzing a horizontal merger.  A and B might be merging to achieve 
economies of scale or other efficiencies that would reduce costs and put 
downward pressure on prices, and might increase innovation.  The key 
question is whether that downward pricing pressure yields welfare gains 
(under a consumer welfare standard rather than a total welfare standard) 
sufficient to offset potential consumer welfare losses insofar as the merger 
reduces price or nonprice competition.  The welfare approach immediately 
highlights the right question and provides a framework for the answer.  The 
choice standard avoids the relevant economic questions—how does the 
merger change the incentives to compete, and what implications do those 
changed incentives, if any, have for welfare?—and instead presumes a loss 
to consumers based upon market structure.  In this way, the choice standard 
imposes a presumption that operates much like the now discredited 
presumptions of pre-modern merger analysis reflected in the 1968 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.52 
One further example underscores the tendency of the choice standard to 
distract from the key economic questions and to avoid analysis of the 
relevant tradeoffs.  Most exclusive dealing arrangements reduce choice in 
the sense relevant to the choice standard.  An exclusive dealing arrangement 
between a manufacturer and retailer or set of retailers necessarily reduces 
the choices available to the consumer at the retailer’s store(s).  For the sake 
of simplicity, assume the manufacturer’s exclusive dealing arrangements 
with its retailers and distributors also generate a net reduction in consumer 
choice, expressed as a loss of product variety in the marketplace.  Under the 
choice standard, nearly all exclusive dealing contracts will be deemed 
unlawful because they restrict the number of nonprice choices (e.g., other 
brands) available to consumers compared to the number that would be 
available but for the exclusive dealing contracts. 
 
 51. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 4 (2010) (“The measurement of market shares and market concentration is not 
an end in itself, but is useful to the extent it illuminates the merger’s likely competitive 
effects.”); see also Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines:  From Hedgehog 
to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 707–08 (2010) (“Many observers have noted 
specifically that the 2010 Guidelines place less weight on market shares and market 
concentration than did predecessors. . . .  The revised Guidelines emphasize that merger 
analysis ultimately is about competitive effects.”); Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s 
Chicago Obsession:  The Case for Evidence-Based Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 241 (2012). 
 52. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.pdf. 
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Though exclusive dealing arrangements can and do pose competitive 
risks, they are generally efficient.53  There are a number of well-known 
efficiency justifications for exclusive dealing.  For example, some exclusive 
arrangements involve intensifying competition for scarce shelf space or 
distribution and therefore result in lower prices for consumers.54  The 
various efficiency justifications for exclusives pose the same types of 
problems discussed above in the merger example, because the choice 
framework applies a presumption of illegality to conduct that is likely to 
improve consumer welfare, accounting for both the gains to consumers in 
the form of lower prices and any losses attributable to some consumers 
substituting a less- for a more-preferred brand.55  The exclusive dealing 
example also exposes a more serious problem with the internal consistency 
of the choice paradigm.  Many exclusive dealing arrangements do not just 
increase price competition; they are intended to align the incentives of 
manufacturers with those of distributors to supply nonprice, promotional 
services56 or to induce asset specific investments that might facilitate 
innovation.57  These nonprice efficiencies may simultaneously reduce 
present choices but increase future choices by providing incentives to invest 
and to innovate.  The choice standard provides no analytical framework 
with which to assess these tradeoffs.  Indeed, while Averitt and Lande pay 
lip service to the importance of taking seriously the tradeoffs between 
various forms of competition—including price, nonprice, innovation, 
quality, and others—the examples betray a structural presumption of 
illegality to be imposed upon a broad range of business conduct that is 
generally thought to be efficient under conventional welfare analysis, 
including welfare analysis incorporating nonprice effects.58 
 
 53. See generally Alden F. Abbott & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Analysis of Tying 
Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing, in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 183 (Keith N. 
Hylton ed., 2010). 
 54. See, e.g., Cooper et al., supra note 44, at 342–43; Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. 
Murphy, Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition for Distribution, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 433, 
443 (2008). 
 55. Klein & Murphy, supra note 54, at 436. 
 56. See Benjamin Klein & Joshua D. Wright, The Economics of Slotting Contracts, 50 
J.L. & ECON. 421, 432–33 (2007); see also Benjamin Klein & Andres V. Lerner, The 
Expanded Economics of Free-Riding:  How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free-Riding and 
Creates Undivided Loyalty, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 473, 489–90 (2007); Benjamin Klein & 
Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints As Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & 
ECON. 265, 266 (1988). 
 57. Klein & Murphy, supra note 54, at 443–44 (describing the role of exclusive dealing 
in facilitating asset-specific investments); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 302–07 
(1978) (discussing contractual solutions to opportunistic firm behavior). 
 58. Federal Trade Commissioner Rosch has endorsed the choice standard.  It is unclear 
whether the endorsement is anything more than a call for greater attention to nonprice 
competition in the application of welfare standards.  Commissioner Rosch agrees the goal of 
antitrust should be to promote consumer welfare, but he first endorsed the consumer choice 
approach as consistent with that goal because it focuses upon harms that result when a 
“firm’s conduct impairs the choices that free competition brings to the marketplace.” 
J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, FTC, Rewriting History:  Antitrust Not As We Know It . . . Yet, 
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II.  WELFARE TRUMPS CHOICE 
The shift from myriad social, political, and protectionist goals to welfare 
has produced significant benefits for consumers and brought coherence to 
antitrust law.  Put simply, the welfare approach has served antitrust well; 
Averitt and Lande acknowledge as much.59  They are not alone.  The 
Antitrust Modernization Commission observed that “[f]or the last few 
decades courts, agencies, and antitrust practitioners have recognized 
consumer welfare as the unifying goal of antitrust law.”60 
The choice standard, as noted in Part I, is not designed to sharpen the 
welfare paradigm but to replace it with “nothing less than a new paradigm 
of the antitrust laws.”61  Averitt and Lande take pains to comfort readers 
that the choice approach is “not a return to the ‘social and political values’ 
paradigm of the 1960s and 1970s, which proved standardless and unduly 
hostile to business.”62  As we have demonstrated, however, the defect with 
the choice standard is that it is inconsistent with the modern economic 
approach to antitrust analysis that focuses courts and agencies not just upon 
the right outcomes (i.e., prices, quantities, innovation, quality), but also 
upon understanding the relationship between the restraint at issue and those 
outcomes and the tradeoffs between different and sometimes inversely 
related dimensions of competition. 
Without the discipline economic analysis provides by reducing the range 
of plausible outcomes in a given case and, thus, limiting the discretion of 
agencies and courts, it is unclear why Averitt and Lande think their new 
paradigm will not allow the same or other political and social values to 
trump welfare in the name of choice.63  Further, the choice standard will 
certainly reduce welfare.  To the extent the choice standard does indirectly 
focus upon economic welfare, Averitt and Lande’s examples suggest their 
model embraces an effects-based analysis rooted in simple structural 
presumptions relating the number of firms or brands in a market to 
consumer welfare.  These presumptions have no basis in modern economic 
 
Remarks at the ABA Antitrust Section 2010 Spring Meeting (Apr. 23, 2010), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100423rewritinghistory.pdf.  As discussed above, 
however, the consumer choice standard is in significant tension with the consumer welfare 
standard.  More recently Rosch has suggested a welfarist approach to consumer choice, 
which he observed may best be viewed as “a strand of consumer welfare that is promoted 
whenever we enforce the antitrust laws against unreasonable restraints on output.” J. Thomas 
Rosch, supra note 22, at 13. 
 59. Averitt & Lande, Using Consumer Choice, supra note 15, at 175 (describing the 
welfare goals of antitrust as “an immense improvement over their predecessors, and they 
have served the field competently for a generation, producing reasonably accurate results in 
most circumstances”). 
 60. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 35 (2007).  
 61. Averitt & Lande, Using Consumer Choice, supra note 15, at 178. 
 62. Id. at 177. 
 63. For one application of the choice framework to justify increased regulation of media 
mergers on social and political grounds, see Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Toward a 
Better Competition Policy for the Media:  The Challenge of Developing Antitrust Policies 
That Support the Media Sector’s Unique Role in Our Democracy, 42 CONN. L. REV. 101 
(2009). 
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theory, are not supported by empirical evidence, and are likely to provide 
misleading answers to the very questions concerning nonprice competition 
and innovation that the choice standard was designed to address.64 
Before we discuss resale price maintenance (RPM)—an example of the 
advantages of welfare analysis over the choice model––consider this basic 
but underappreciated point concerning the economic theory of consumer 
choice as it relates to antitrust welfare standards:  nothing in the 
microeconomic theory of consumer choice and the associated concept of 
revealed preference65 requires antitrust analysis to ignore or underweigh 
nonprice dimensions of competition.  Economists consult consumers’ 
revealed preferences, as expressed in their actual choices, in order to 
recover information about their welfare.  The standard microeconomic 
framework requires the assumption that consumer preferences are relatively 
stable, but those preferences can and do incorporate various nonprice 
values.  Within the standard model, consumers economize on tradeoffs by 
evaluating different bundles of goods and services with different price and 
nonprice attributes and make purchasing decisions subject to a budget 
constraint.  Therefore, to incorporate nonprice elements into the standard 
model, as a conceptual matter, no revolution is required.  Moreover, as a 
practical matter, nearly all merger simulation models, a variety of other 
applications in industrial organization, and antitrust analysis specifically 
contemplate consumers making decisions among products differentiated in 
both price and quality.66 
We focus here upon two primary advantages of the welfare standard over 
the choice standard in cases involving nonprice competition and innovation.  
First, the welfare approach highlights tradeoffs between various forms of 
competition and their effects.  This is critical because, contra Averitt and 
Lande, a marginal increase in the number of choices available in a market 
could increase, decrease, or have no effect upon nonprice competition.  
Second, the welfare approach highlights, rather than obfuscates, the relevant 
economic forces at work.  Again, this advantage is critical to coherent and 
predictable antitrust analysis under the rule of reason67 because economic 
 
 64. For critiques of the behavioral economics antitrust program, see Douglas H. 
Ginsburg & Derek Moore, The Future of Behavioral Economics in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 
6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 89 (2010); Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone II, Misbehavioral 
Economics:  The Case Against Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517 (2012). 
 65. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS:  A MODERN APPROACH 121 (8th 
ed. 2010) (describing revealed preference with the statement:  “If a bundle X is chosen over a 
bundle Y, then X must be preferred to Y.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 66. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.  We are more sympathetic to the 
view that neither the theoretical relationship between competition and innovation nor the 
available empirical evidence provides sufficient economic knowledge for reliable predictions 
required for antitrust analysis. See Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 50, at 1.  However, 
Averitt and Lande appear to endorse these presumptions and “innovation market” analysis. 
Averitt & Lande, Using Consumer Choice, supra note 15, at 187. 
 67. Obviously, per se rules and de facto per se rules are quite predictable even if they are 
welfare decreasing and anticompetitive, as Justice Potter Stewart famously noted in his 
dissent in United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., 
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analysis illuminates how a business arrangement affects the incentives of 
firms and of consumers and which tradeoffs matter in any particular case, 
and can give a sense of the magnitudes of the competitive effects at issue.  
We explore these advantages with an example showing how welfare 
analysis focuses upon the right questions and avoids the errors the choice 
framework would bring to such cases. 
In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,68 the Supreme 
Court held minimum resale price maintenance would be analyzed under the 
rule of reason.69  The Court deemed the previously longstanding per se rule 
against RPM inappropriate because, although RPM could be 
anticompetitive, the economic theory and evidence simply did not 
demonstrate that the practice “always or almost always tend[s] to restrict 
competition and decrease output.”70 
The fundamental economic question concerning RPM—both minimum 
and maximum—especially in a competitive retail market with no free 
riding,71 is whether retailers lack a sufficient incentive to promote the 
manufacturer’s product adequately.  In other words, why isn’t competition 
at the retail level a sufficient incentive to provide the efficient level of 
promotional services?  It is a question that has stumped many, including 
Justice Breyer, who dissented in Leegin.72  Interestingly, the opinion of the 
Court provides an answer, citing Klein and Murphy’s seminal article on the 
economics of vertical restraints, which analyzed this question more than 
twenty years ago.73 
 
dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s analysis while observing “[t]he sole consistency that I 
can find is that in litigation under § 7, the Government always wins”). 
 68. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 69. The Court had overruled the per se rule against maximum RPM ten years earlier in 
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). See Benjamin Klein, Distribution Restrictions 
Operate by Creating Dealer Profits:  Explaining the Use of Maximum Resale Price 
Maintenance in State Oil v. Kahn, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1999). 
 70. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894 (quoting Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 
U.S. 717, 723 (1988)); see Brief of Amici Curiae Economists in Support of Petitioner at 16, 
Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 173681 (“In the theoretical literature, it is 
essentially undisputed that minimum RPM can have procompetitive effects and that under a 
variety of market conditions it is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects”).  The best 
estimate of the prevalence of collusion in RPM cases is no greater than 15 percent. See 
Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance:  Empirical Evidence from Litigation, 34 J.L. 
& ECON. 263, 270 (1991). 
 71. For an efficiency explanation of RPM in the presence of interdealer free riding on 
promotional services, see Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 
3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 91–93 (1960). 
 72. 551 U.S. at 921 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I do not understand how, in the absence of 
free riding (and assuming competitiveness), an established producer would need resale price 
maintenance.  Why, on these assumptions, would a dealer not ‘expand’ its ‘market share’ as 
best that dealer sees fit, obtaining appropriate payment from consumers in the process?  
There may be an answer to this question.  But I have not seen it.”). 
 73. See id. at 892 (majority opinion) (citing Klein & Murphy, supra note 56).  For a 
recent restatement and extension of Klein & Murphy’s analysis, see Benjamin Klein, 
Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the Absence of Free Riding, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 
431 (2009). 
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Klein and Murphy demonstrate that retailers will undersupply 
promotional services because manufacturers do not take into account the 
incremental profit margin the manufacturer earns on promotional sales 
when some, but not all, consumers value the promotional service.  
Manufacturers and retailers have divergent interests with respect to the 
retailers supplying presale promotional effort.  The conflict derives from 
two economic factors common in markets where RPM is observed.  First, a 
manufacturer’s profit margin (the difference between the wholesale price 
and the marginal cost of production) on an incremental sale induced by 
retailer promotion is generally larger than the retailer’s profit margin (the 
difference between the retail and wholesale prices).74  Second, the 
manufacturer’s incremental sales owing to the retailer’s brand-specific 
efforts are often greater than the retailer’s incremental sales.  When a 
retailer provides services to promote a specific manufacturer’s product, the 
increase in total retail sales is not generally sufficient to offset the lower 
retail profit margin.  In fact, when a multiproduct retailer promotes a 
particular brand, for example Coca-Cola, the primary effect is to shift 
demand among brands, not to increase the aggregate quantity demanded for 
all brands.75 
When these conditions obtain, we expect to observe manufacturers 
compensate retailers for providing promotional services.  One such method 
of compensation involves RPM; others involve per-unit time payments, 
such as slotting contracts, cooperating marketing arrangements, or a 
reduction in the wholesale price.  The fundamental objective of all such 
payments is to provide a premium stream of revenue to retailers as an 
inducement to provide promotional services.  These promotional services 
are valuable to some consumers but not others; their provision is efficient, 
however, in the sense that they increase output.  Indeed, despite claims to 
the contrary,76 understanding RPM as facilitating the supply of nonprice 
 
 74. This is highly likely to be the case where manufacturers produce branded, 
differentiated goods and face substantially less elastic demand than do retailers.  Because 
retailers do not take into account the additional profit margin the manufacturer earns on 
promotional sales, their incentive to provide promotion will be insufficient from the 
manufacturer’s point of view.  For a more complete analysis of the incentive conflict-based 
interretailer demand effects, see Klein & Wright, supra note 56; Ralph A. Winter, Vertical 
Control and Price Versus Nonprice Competition, 108 Q.J. ECON. 61 (1993). 
 75. In other words, promotion-induced sales of Coca-Cola are likely to be at least 
partially offset by a decrease in the sales of other soda products. 
 76. Critics of RPM claim that RPM either cannot or does not prevent some retailers from 
free riding on the promotional services provided by other retailers and therefore infer an 
anticompetitive effect from any increase in retail prices. See Warren S. Grimes, The Path 
Forward After Leegin:  Seeking Consensus Reform of the Antitrust Law of Vertical 
Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 467 (2008); Marina Lao, Free Riding:  An Overstated, and 
Unconvincing, Explanation for Resale Price Maintenance, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 
OVERSHOT THE MARK:  THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. 
ANTITRUST 196 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). 
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promotional services implies that RPM can both increase output and reduce 
retail prices.77   
The welfare approach not only accounts for the nonprice amenities 
associated with RPM; it also answers the fundamental question why firms 
adopt RPM arrangements.  We are therefore equipped with a better 
understanding of the competitive effects of RPM on both price and nonprice 
dimensions.  An important implication is that antitrust agencies and courts 
should evaluate RPM by its effects not upon price but upon output.  The 
welfare approach thus illuminates the correct questions, deepens our 
understanding of the business practice, and can identify for courts and 
agencies what types of evidence are useful in determining its actual impact 
and role in the competitive process. 
The choice framework, on the other hand, approaches RPM without 
regard to its welfare effects.  Averitt and Lande briefly mention RPM as 
potentially harmful because it tends to decrease the number of price options 
available in the marketplace.78  RPM restricts the pricing freedom of 
retailers and, thus, inevitably restricts the pricing options available to 
consumers; it is therefore presumably suspect under the choice framework. 
Commissioner Rosch agrees and claims that, after Leegin, evidence of a 
reduction in consumer choice is sufficient to make out a prima facie case 
that a defendant’s RPM arrangement violates section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.79  Rosch argues this is the law because Leegin permits consumers to 
choose between buying from a “no frills” discounter and buying at a higher 
price from a reseller offering pre- or postsale services along with the 
product.80  “Or, to put it in economic terms, a higher resale price may be 
justified by evidence that, despite the higher price, there has been an 
increase in output.”81 
 
 77. Those who claim RPM always increases the retail price contemplate a manufacturer 
increasing the retailer’s margin by holding the wholesale price constant, increasing the retail 
price above competitive levels, and imposing RPM to ensure that price competition does not 
dissipate the additional profit margin.  A manufacturer can achieve the same effect by 
reducing both the wholesale price by an amount greater than it reduces the retail price— 
thus, still increasing the retailer’s profit margin and inducing provision of the presale 
services.  Consequently, RPM does not necessarily result in higher retail prices as a matter of 
economic theory.  Rather, one should think of the provision of presale services as reducing 
the “effective price” paid by the consumers who value those services; that is, a reduction in 
price to marginal consumers moving the manufacturer along the demand curve.  Similarly, 
this well-accepted analysis of RPM implies that evaluating only the price effects of RPM is 
an error.  Because retail prices might increase under both the anticompetitive cartel 
explanation of RPM as well under the efficiency explanation, a better test is to evaluate the 
effects of the restraint upon output. 
 78. Averitt & Lande, Using Consumer Choice, supra note 15, at 189. 
 79. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, FTC, Convergence and Comity:  Still Improbable?, 
Remarks Before the Friends of Europe Roundtable on New Transatlantic Trends in 
Competition Policy 7 (June 10, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/1007
10transatlanticremarks.pdf (“[A]fter the Supreme Court’s Leegin decision, injury to 
consumer choice (as well as an increase in price) is now recognized as injury to consumer 
welfare in the United States.”). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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Leegin neither holds nor says that.  The Court abandoned the per se rule 
against minimum RPM and, in so doing, gave manufacturers the legal 
ability, by contract, to prevent retailers from discounting the price of their 
product.  Although the Court acknowledged that RPM might result in a 
greater diversity of price and quality options for consumers,82 nowhere did 
the Court suggest that merely demonstrating a reduction in choice is 
sufficient to shift to the defendant the burden of justifying its RPM policy 
with evidence of increased output.  On the contrary, the Court rejected 
arguments that isolate a single dimension of competition, including price, to 
demonstrate that RPM is likely to have had an anticompetitive effect in a 
particular case precisely because an increase in price is not inconsistent 
with RPM having increased consumer welfare when nonprice benefits are 
taken into account.83  The Court is not as easily moved off the welfarist 
foundation of modern antitrust law as Commissioner Rosch seems to think 
or to wish. 
There are, to be sure, modern antitrust decisions in which the Court 
generally discusses choice or product variety as they relate to competitive 
effects, which Averitt and Lande cite in support of their argument that the 
choice standard is consistent with prevailing law.84  That there are such 
cases is not surprising, however:  holding price, output, and quality 
constant, eliminating a choice valued by at least some consumers does 
reduce welfare.  That does not make choice rather than welfare a goal of 
antitrust law, much less an adequate guide to antitrust decision making.  
The very point of analyzing the economics of business arrangements, and a 
point that has not escaped the Court, is that those arrangements arise not 
randomly but rather because of their effects upon prices, output, quality, 
and innovation.  Economic analysis allows a better understanding of how 
business arrangements affect incentives to compete along different margins, 
how to assess those tradeoffs in theory and in practice, and how to analyze 
the ultimate effect of those restraints upon welfare. 
RPM also provides an excellent example of the benefits of a welfare 
standard informed by the empirical evidence that has been accumulated 
over the last thirty years.  A few recent surveys summarize the existing 
empirical literature on vertical restraints generally and on RPM in 
particular.  The first, by a group of economists at the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Antitrust Division, reviewed twenty-four empirical 
 
 82. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890 (2007) 
(“Resale price maintenance also has the potential to give consumers more options so that 
they can choose among low-price, low-service brands; high-price, high-service brands; and 
brands that fall in between.”). 
 83. Id. at 895 (“Respondent is mistaken in relying on pricing effects absent a further 
showing of anticompetitive conduct.”). 
 84. Averitt & Lande, Using Consumer Choice, supra note 15, at 189–91.  For example, 
Averitt and Lande point to United States v. Dentsply International, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 194 
(3d Cir. 2005), where the Third Circuit observed “[a]n additional anti-competitive effect is 
seen in the exclusionary practice here that limits the choices of products open to dental 
laboratories.” Id. at 194. 
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papers published between 1984 and 2005, focusing upon the effects of 
vertical restraints and vertical integration (which substitutes managerial for 
contractual imposition of vertical restraints).  They concluded, “[e]mpirical 
analyses of vertical integration and control have failed to find compelling 
evidence that these practices have harmed competition, and numerous 
studies find otherwise.”85 
The second study reviewed a similar and overlapping set of papers and 
reached similar conclusions.86  A more recent analysis of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on vertical restraints, including RPM, by an economist 
at the Federal Trade Commission, concluded that “[w]ith few exceptions, 
the literature does not support the view that these practices are used for 
anticompetitive reasons,” and that the evidence “supports a fairly strong 
prior belief that these practices are unlikely to be anti-competitive in most 
cases.”87 
The RPM example not only illustrates the advantages of the welfare 
standard in cases involving nonprice elements, it also shows that the errors 
induced by Averitt and Lande’s choice standard are not harmless but are 
likely to be harmful to consumers on both price and nonprice dimensions. 
CONCLUSION 
The choice standard, if adopted, would inevitably reduce consumer and 
total welfare by shifting the focus of antitrust analysis from efficiency to 
more easily observed but misleading proxies for consumer welfare, to wit, 
the number of firms on offer in a market.  While incorporating product 
variety, quality, and innovation into the standard welfare analysis is 
desirable when done correctly, no “new paradigm of the antitrust laws” is 
required to do that; modern antitrust analysis quite comfortably incorporates 
the tradeoffs between price and quality that consumers face.  The flaw of 
the choice standard is that it altogether rejects the economic approach to 
dealing with these tradeoffs and instead imposes a structural presumption 
that the number of firms or brands in competition is directly correlated with 
consumer welfare.  This involves two major errors:  by rejecting the 
economic approach, the choice standard forgoes illumination as to why 
certain restraints arise in a particular market and, by imposing a structural 
presumption, it implicitly depends upon conclusions about welfare that are 
not justified either by theory or by evidence.  In sum, the choice standard 
 
 85. James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy As a Problem of Inference, 23 INT’L 
J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 658 (2005). 
 86. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: 
Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 
32, at 391. 
 87. Daniel P. O’Brien, The Antitrust Treatment of Vertical Restraints:  Beyond the 
Possibility Theorems, in REPORT:  THE PROS AND CONS OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 40, 76 
(2008), available at http://www.konkurrensverket.se/upload/Filer/Trycksaker/Rapporter/
Pros&Cons/rap_pros_and_cons_vertical_restraints.pdf. 
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would produce antitrust decisions uninformed by the contributions of 
modern industrial organization economics. 
The ultimate question is whether the consumer choice standard offers any 
offsetting benefit in exchange for the loss of welfare it entails.  If not, as we 
think we have shown, then shifting to defendants the burden of justifying 
any reduction in consumer choice would be merely a revival of the long ago 
repudiated inhospitality tradition in antitrust88 that should and likely will be 
rejected by the enforcement agencies and the courts. 
 
 88. The phrase “inhospitality tradition” seems to have originated with Donald F. Turner, 
Some Reflections on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N ANTITRUST L. SYMP. 1, 12 (“I 
approach territorial and customer restrictions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but 
inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law.”).  On the inhospitality tradition today, see Alan 
J. Meese, Reframing Antitrust in Light of Scientific Revolution:  Accounting for Transaction 
Costs in Rule of Reason Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 466 (2010). 
